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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MIGUEL ENRIQUE SALAS-LEYVA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900418-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 
Rule 26(2)(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann, 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953 as amended). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was the detention of Defendant and his vehicle 
unreasonable? 
a. Did the officer have a reasonable articulable 
suspicion which justified stopping the vehicle where he 
erroneously believed that the driver was not licensed to 
drive? 
b. Was the stop a "pretext" in violation of the 
fourth amendment? 
c. Assuming arguendo that the stop was proper, did 
the officer's actions exceed the scope of a stop for a 
traffic violation, thereby violating the fourth amendment? 
Standard of Review, This Court reviews "findings of fact 
supporting a trial court's m nion to suppress under a clearly 
erroneous standard. [citations omitted]." State v. Bobo, 149 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 67, 68 (Utah App. 1990). "The trial court's factual 
determinations are clearly erroneous only if in conflict with the 
clear weight of the evidence [citation omitted], or if this court 
has a 'definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.' 
[citation omitted]." Id. 
While this Court accords "considerable deference to factual 
findings since the trial court is in the best position to evaluate 
witness credibility and the like, [it] examine[s] the conclusions of 
law arising from those findings under a correction of the error 
standard according no particular deference to the trial court, 
[citations omitted]." Id. at 69. 
2. Did Defendant consent to a search of the vehicle so as 
to vitiate the prior illegality of the stop? 
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a. Did the trial court err in concluding that the 
defendant voluntarily consented to the search? 
b. Did the State fail to establish that the 
officers did not exploit the primary illegality in 
obtaining the consent? 
Standard of Review, This Court reviews "findings of fact 
supporting a trial court's motion to suppress under a clearly 
erroneous standard. [citations omitted]." State v. Bobo, 149 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 67, 68 (Utah App. 1990). "The trial court's factual 
determinations are clearly erroneous only if in conflict with the 
clear weight of the evidence [citation omitted], or if this court 
has a 'definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.' 
[citation omitted]." Id. 
While this Court accords "considerable deference to factual 
findings since the trial court is in the best position to evaluate 
witness credibility and the like, [it] examine[s] the conclusions of 
law arising from those findings under a correction of the erroi 
standard according no particular deference to the trial court, 
[citations omitted]." Id. at 69. 
"[T]he factual findings leading to the trial court's 
determination that defendant voluntarily consented to the 
search . . . are considered for clear error and the legal conclusion 
of voluntary consent premised upon those facts is examined for 
correctness. [citation omitted]. State v. Bobo, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 69. 
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3. Was there insufficient evidence to establish that the 
defendant possessed the cocaine where the drugs were found under the 
back seat where a passenger was seated immediately prior to the stop 
in a car owned and being driven by the defendant? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the verdict, and reverses a conviction where 
"the evidence and its inferences are so 'inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted./lf State v. Moore, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 31 (Ct. App. 
1989), citing State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
4. Did the trial court err in instructing the jury 
regarding the beyond a reasonable doubt standard? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews conclusions of law 
for correctness. Scharf v. B.M.G. Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 
1985). "An appeal challenging the refusal to give jury instruction 
presents a question of law only. Therefore, [this Court] grant[s] 
no particular deference to the trial court's rulings." State v. 
Pedersen. 150 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Prior to trial, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress the 
cocaine found in the vehicle, claiming that it was seized in 
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violation of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. (A copy of the 
motion is contained in Addendum A). The trial judge denied the 
motion, (A copy of the trial court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law is contained in Addendum B.) Following a juily 
trial held on May 3\f 1990 and June 1, 1990, a jury convicted 
Appellant of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third 
degree felony. The trial judge sentenced Appellant to a term of 
zero to five years in the Utah State Prison, but stayed the prison 
sentence and placed Defendant on probation; Appellant is not 
currently in custody. This appeal arises out of that judgment and 
conviction. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 2, 1990, at around noon, Detective McCarthy waited 
with special agent Craig Englin outside Utah Metal. Tl:6-7; T2:10, 
ll.1 The detective^ were in plain clothes in an unmarked car. 
Tl:7. Detective McCarthy was assigned to the Metro Narcotic Strike 
Force and special a^ent Englin was employed by the United States 
Immigration Service, Tl:2, 28; T2:8, 34. A backup unit with a 
couple of other Met^o detectives was also present. Tl:6; T2:ll 
The transcript in this case consists of two volumes. 
The Motion to Suppress hearing held on May 23, 1990 will be denoted 
at Tl; the volume containing both days of trial, May 31 and June 1, 
1990, will be cited
 as T2. 
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Detective McCarthy had received information that morning 
from a confidential informant whom he had not used in the past that 
an individual would be driving a certain vehicle during his lunch 
hour and would be delivering cocaine. Tl:6; T2:ll. 
Detective McCarthy testified that he "was given a physical 
description of Mr. Salas, his name, his date of birth, his age, 
where he worked, what time he was going to lunch, what type of 
vehicle he would be driving, and that he would be in possession of 
cocaine." Tl:6. At around 11:00 a.m., Det. McCarthy ran a check 
with the state computer to determine whether Defendant had a valid 
license. Tl:4. He could not find a valid license. Tl:4. 
Immediately prior to stopping the vehicle which Defendant was 
driving, Det. McCarthy did a secondary check for a license with the 
Salt Lake City dispatcher. Tl:5. Again, he was unable to come up 
with a license. Tl:5. 
Defendant's Exhibit Number 1 is a valid driver's license 
issued to Defendant under his name—Miguel S. Leyva—on March 13, 
1989. Tl:16, 41. 
On direct examination, Det. McCarthy stated that he checked 
the name "Miguel Salas" (Tl:4); however, on cross-examination, he 
acknowledged that the police report in the instant case lists 
Defendant's name as "Miguel Salas-Leyva" and that he remembered 
"running about three different names or variations of the name 
"Miguel Salas" because he had a printout or some other information 
that indicated that there was another spelling of Defendant's name. 
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Tl:14-15.2 Det. McCarthy alsp testified that he believed that Me 
had the name Miguel Salas-Leyva when he ran the computer check. 
Tl:27, 48-9. Agent Englin also testified that both officers kn^ rw 
the name Miguel Salas-Leyva before stopping Defendant. Tl:38. 
After running the computer check, Officers McCarthy and 
Englin, along with other plainclothes officers in another car, 
waited outside Defendant's work place. T2:ll. McCarthy and Englin 
were not in uniform; McCarthy was driving a white Corvette. T2:65. 
The officers watched Enrique exit his work place with two other male 
Hispanics; the threesome then got into the car which the officers 
later found to be registered to Enrique, turned onto an access road, 
then drove south on North Beck Street towards the city. T2:12. 
Det. McCarthy then effected a traffic stop of the vehicle. T2:13. 
Det. McCarthy testified that the traffic violation for not 
having a driver's license was the basis for the stop, but that his 
ultimate goal in stopping the vehicle was to search the car. 
Tl:13-14. 
After stopping the vehicle, Det. McCarthy asked Enrique 
whether he had a license. Tl:7-8. Enrique indicated that he did 
have one, but that it was in his wallet back at work. Tl:16. 
Enrique showed the officer title to the car, and either showed him 
2
 In Mexico, individuals adopt the surname of both 
parents. In this case, the defendant testified that his name is 
Miguel Enrique Salas-Leyva ("Enrique"). Tl:40. He testified 
further that when he obtained his driver's license, he was told that 
he could not put this entire name on it. Tl:44. 
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registration or the officer checked the car on the computer. Tl:8, 
17. The vehicle was registered to Enrique and his wife. Tl:47-48. 
Enrique testified that it was registered under the name Salas-Leyva 
(Tl:44); the detective testified that it was registered under 
Salas. Tl:47-8. The registration was not placed in evidence. 
At least four officers were present after the vehicle was 
stopped. Tl:20; T2:36, 38, 66. Det. McCarthy did not himself issue 
a citation although he believed one was issued, but could not 
remember the officer's name. Tl:17. If one were issued, it was 
written by a uniformed officer who arrived after the search of the 
vehicle had begun. Tl:17; T2:21. 
Before any citation was issued and shortly after stopping 
the vehicle, both Det. McCarthy and Agent Englin indicated to 
Enrique that they wanted to search his car for drugs. Tl:8, 9; 
T2:27. During the Motion to Suppress hearing, McCarthy testified 
that he told Enrique, "I can either go and get me a warrant" (Tl:24) 
if Enrique refused consent; during his trial testimony, McCarthy 
denied telling Defendant that he could get a warrant. T2:25. 
It became apparent to Det. McCarthy that Enrique might be 
having some difficulty with English, so he asked Agent Englin to 
translate the request for consent to search into Spanish. Tl:8-9. 
At the time the officers asked for consent, Enrique was not 
free to go. The four or five officers remained at the scene and 
were questioning the passengers about their immigration status, 
among other things. Tl:17, 21; T2:67. The officers had the 
passengers out of the car and ran warrants checks on them. The 
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passenger who was seated in the back seat was arrested on a 
warrant• T2:64. 
One of the passengers testified at trial that five 
plainclothes officers stopped the vehicle he was riding in, T2:66. 
He testified further that the officers were hostile towards him and 
after about twenty minutes, took him out of the car and pushed him 
up against a fence, spread his legs and frisked him. T2:67-8. He 
claimed that the officers made them keep their backs to the car 
while they searched it. 
The officers claimed that Enrique gave them permission to 
search the car. Enrique testified that he was not asked for 
permission and never gave it. Tl:42. 
The officers searched the entire car, including the trunk. 
Tl:21-2; T2:29. Passenger Morales testified that they also lifted 
the hood and searched under it. T2:69. Agent Englin eventually 
found a small packet of cocaine under the back seat behind the 
driver's seat. Tl:33. The seat had to be removed to find it. 
T2:49. Although Det. McCarthy believed that the back seat passenger 
had been seated behind the front passenger when the officers 
effected the stop, Agent Englin testified that the passenger was 
behind the driver and moved around right before the stop. Tl:9; 
T2:38, 40. Neither of the passengers were charged with possession 
of the cocaine. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The detention of the defendant violated the fourth 
amendment. Because the defendant was licensed to drive in the state 
of Utah, the officers' decision to stop the vehicle for the traffic 
violation of driving without a license cannot withstand a fourth 
amendment challenge. 
The officers stopped the vehicle as a pretext to search the 
vehicle for drugs. A reasonable officer under the circumstances 
would not have stopped the vehicle, but for a desire to search the 
car. 
Even if the initial stop were proper, the detention 
exceeded the proper scope of a traffic stop. Although the trial 
court found that the stop lasted only a short period of time, the 
officers pursued areas which they could not pursue unless they had a 
reasonable articulable suspicion that the occupants were engaged in 
serious crime. 
Consent to search did not vitiate the illegal stop. The 
trial court erred in concluding that the defendant voluntarily 
consented to a search of his vehicle. Although the trial court did 
not reach a conclusion as to whether the officers exploited the 
primary illegality, a conclusion that the State failed to sustain 
its burden that no such exploitation occurred is apparent from the 
record. 
There was insufficient evidence to establish that the 
defendant "possessed" the cocaine found under the back seat of his 
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car where two other occupants were in the car, one of which was 
seated in the back seat. 
The trial judge erred in instructing the jury regarding the 
concept of "beyond a reasonable doubt." The instruction given by 
the court failed to give the jury any guidance as to the meaning of 
the concept. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE STOP OF DEFENDANTS VEHICLE VIOLATED 
THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION. 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, 
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, protects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Where evidence is 
seized in violation of the fourth amendment, it cannot be used 
against a defendant at trial. Furthermore, any "fruits of the 
poisonous tree" are not admissible. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 
A. THE OFFICERS LACKED A REASONABLE ARTICULABLE 
SUSPICION TO STOP DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE BECAUSE THE 
INFORMATION THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE A VALID 
DRIVER'S LICENSE WAS INCORRECT. 
While not all encounters between the police and citizens 
amount to "seizures" under the fourth amendment (see State v. 
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-8 (Utah 1987)), a police officer's 
detention of a vehicle and its occupants is a seizure protected by 
the fourth amendment. State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah App. 
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1989) quoting State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988) 
(overruled on other grounds); see also Delaware v, Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648 (1979); State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 123 (Utah 1982); State v. 
Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989). 
A police officer may stop a motor vehicle for a traffic 
offense committed in his presence, or when he has a reasonable 
articulable suspicion based on objective facts that the driver or 
one of the occupants has committed or is about to commit a crime. 
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App. 1988) (overruled on 
other grounds, State v. Arro ,^ 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990)); State v. 
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah 1990). 
In the present case, the officer testified that he stopped 
the vehicle for the traffic violation of no driver's license.3 
3
 The State did not attempt to establish that the officers 
had a reasonable articulable suspicion based on the informant's tip 
which justified stopping Enrique. In fact, when defense counsel 
attempted to explore the information given by the confidential 
informant to the officers, the prosecutor objected. Tl:ll. The 
State's position in the trial court seems to concede that the 
officers did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion based on 
the informant's tip. The facts also show that such a reasonable 
articulable suspicion did not exist. The detective had not used the 
confidential information in this case before. Tl:ll. The State did 
not establish the reliability of the informant or the reliability of 
the information; nor is there anything in the record establishing 
how or where the information was received. See generally State v. 
Dronenburg, 781 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1988). It is not clear from 
the record whether the officers obtained certain information, e.g. 
Enrique's date of birth and picture, from the confidential informant 
or as follow up after the confidential informant gave them Enrique's 
name. Tl:66. The general information that Enrique would be 
carrying drugs could apply to any individual the police were 
watching and had a hunch might be carrying drugs. More details 
regarding the quantity, delivery site, etc. and/or information 
regarding the reliability of the confidential informant would be 
(footnote 3 continued) 
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In State v. Constantino. 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court upheld an officer's stopping of a vehicle where the 
officer knew that the driver's license had been suspended and 
recognized a passenger and knew that a warrant for the passenger's 
arrest existed. Prior to stopping the vehicle, the officer 
affirmatively confirmed that the driver's license was still 
suspended and that an active arrest warrant remained in effect on 
the passenger. Id.4 See also State v. Gibson. 665 P.2d 1302 
(Utah), cert, denied 464 U.S. 894, 104 S.Ct. 241, 78 L.Ed.2d 231 
(1983) . 
By contrast, in the present case, the officer did not 
confirm a suspension of a license; instead, he was simply unable to 
locate a license under the name he believed to be that of the 
(footnote 3 continued) 
required to stop a vehicle based on a tip. See generally Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); United 
States v. Henslev. 469 U.S. 221, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 
(1985). 
4
 Driving on revocation for a "DUI" is a class A 
misdemeanor, Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-136 (1953 as amended). Driving 
without a valid license is a class B misdemeanor, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-2-113 (1953 as amended). Where a person is validly licensed 
but does not have the license in his possession while driving, the 
Operator's License Act explicitly provides that producing the 
license in court is a defense, Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-124(2). Within 
the class B misdemeanor charge of "No Driver's License," several 
distinct crimes occur. The least serious is driving without being 
licensed; the more serious includes driving after a license is 
suspended for accumulating too many points. As a practical matter, 
courts treat the latter more seriously for sentencing purposes than 
the former even though both are class B misdemeanors. 
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driver.5 Because an individual could be licensed in any of the 
fifty states or internationally and be driving legally in Utah under 
certain circumstances, the distinction between an affirmative 
confirmation of license suspension and a negative inability to 
locate a license is compelling in determining whether justification 
for a stop occurred. 
Furthermore, in assessing whether a detention for a traffic 
violation was permissible in the present case, the officer's 
information regarding the identity of the driver should be 
considered. Det. McCarthy's testimony is unclear as to whether he 
knew Enrique's entire name and ran a check on that name. Tl:4, 14; 
Tl:15. The information the officer relied on regarding the identity 
of the driver came from an unnamed confidential informant who the 
officer had never used before. Tl:ll. The officer himself did not 
know Enrique before the incident in this case occurred. Tl:12. The 
State offered no evidence demonstrating that Det. McCarthy had 
confirmed the driver's name through other sources prior to the stop 
or had established the knowledge or reliability of the confidential 
informant in regard to the driver's identity. 
Although the lack of affirmative confirmation of Enrique's 
licensing status and the lack of objective facts regarding the 
driver's identity prior to the stop are compelling, the most 
5
 Nor did he have knowledge of a warrant on any of the 
passengers, as did the officer in Constantino. In Constantino, the 
court lumped together the officer's knowledge regarding the driver 
and passenger, without clarifying whether each standing alone would 
have been sufficient to justify the detention of the vehicle. 
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troubling aspect of the stop is the evidence that Enrique was, in 
fact, legally licensed to drive in the State of Utah. 
In Whitelev v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971), the Court held 
that although police officers are allowed to arrest an individual 
based on a bulletin issued by another police agency, where it turns 
out that the issuing agency did not have probable cause to arrest, 
the arrest is illegal under the fourth amendment. The Court stated: 
We do not, of course, question that the Laramie 
police were entitled to act on the strength of the 
radio bulletin. Certainly police officers called 
upon to aid other officers in executing arrest 
warrants are entitl ..d to assume that the officers 
requesting aid offered the magistrate the 
information requisite to support an independent 
judicial assessment of probable cause. Where, 
however, the contrary turns out to be true, an 
otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from 
challenge by the decision of the instigating officer 
to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest. 
Id. at 568. See also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985) 
(officers may stop and briefly detain individuals in reliance on a 
"wanted" flyer issued by another police department where issuing 
department had a reasonable articulable suspicion that individuals 
had committed crime); State v. Bruce. 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989) 
(police officers may stop car in reliance on police broadcast issued 
by officers who had a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify a 
stop). 
In United States v. DeLeon-Reyna, 898 F.2d 486, 489 (5th 
Cir. 1990) (rehearing granted 908 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1990)), the 
Court interpreted Whiteley and Hensley as demonstrating that "the 
collective knowledge of all of the officers involved must provide 
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sufficient grounds to justify a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity." Id. at 489; see also United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 
307, 323 (5th Cir. 1984), cert, denied. 471 U.S. 1106, 105 S.Ct. 
2340, 85 L.Ed.2d 855 (1985); United States v. Shaw. 701 F.2d 367, 
377 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1067, 104 S.Ct. 
1419, 75 L.Ed.2d 744 (1984). 
In DeLeon-Revna, the arresting officer, a border patrol 
agent, radioed the license plate of a truck, WM-1438, to a 
dispatcher. The officer did not clarify each letter with a 
code-name follow-up word, and the dispatcher erroneously ran a check 
on "WN-1438." Armed with the incorrect information that the license 
plate did not belong to the truck he was following, the officer 
pulled the truck over. The Fifth Circuit held that the collective 
knowledge of the officers "failed to provide a sufficient basis for 
reasonable suspicion." Id. at 489. The Court noted that the 
officer's error in transmitting the license plate could "[a]t a 
minimum . . . give rise to a false suspicion that criminal activity 
is afoot, and thus lead to arbitrary and intrusive investigatory 
stops." Id. at 492. See also People v. Fortier. 533 P.2d 1206 
(Ariz. 1976). 
In the present case, the totality of the circumstances 
establish that the detention of Enrique's vehicle for a traffic 
violation was not reasonable. 
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B. THE DETENTION OF THE VEHICLE FOR A TRAFFIC 
VIOLATION WAS A PRETEXT TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE FOR 
DRUGS AND VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
In the present case, Det. McCarthy acknowledged that his 
purpose in stopping the vehicle for a traffic violation was to 
ultimately gain consent to search the vehicle and person of 
Defendant for drugs. Tl:13-14. He did not normally issue citations 
for traffic violations, nor did he do so in this case. Tl:17. 
As this Court acknowledged in Sierra. 754 P.2d at 977: 
A police officer may, however, stop an automobile 
for a traffic violation committed in the officer's 
presence. [citations omitted]. However, it is 
impermissible for law enforcement officers to use a 
misdemeanor arrest as a pretext to search for 
evidence of a more serious crime. [citations 
omitted]. 
The evils of permitting a pretext stop are obvious: 
The violation of a constitutional right by 
subterfuge cannot be justified . . . Were the use of 
misdemeanor arrest warrants as a pretext for 
searching people suspected of felonies to be 
permitted a mockery could be made of the Fourth 
Amendment and its guarantees. The courts must be 
vigilant to detect and prevent such a misuse of 
legal process. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977, quoting Taalavore v. United States, 291 
F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1961). 
This Court and various other courts have focused on an 
objective assessment of the totality of the circumstances in 
determining whether a pretext stop has occurred. Sierra, 754 P.2d 
at 977-8, citing inter alia Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 105 
S.Ct. 2778, 2783, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985); Scott v. United States, 436 
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U.S. 128, 137, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1973); United 
States v. Smith. 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986). 
In Sierra. 754 P.2d at 978, this Court quoted United 
States v. Smith. 799 F.2d at 708 (emphasis in original): 
In determining whether an investigative stop is 
invalid as pretextual, the proper inquiry is whether 
a reasonable officer would have made the seizure in 
the absence of illegitimate motivation. Because the 
evidence suggests that a reasonable officer would 
not have stopped the appellants without an invalid 
purpose to obtain evidence of additional criminal 
activity, we reverse. 
See also United States v. Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 
1988) . 
In Guzman. 864 F.2d at 1515, the Tenth Circuit stated: 
A pretextual stop occurs when the police use a legal 
justification to make the stop in order to search a 
person or place, or to interrogate a person, for an 
unrelated serious crime for which they do not have 
the reasonable suspicion necessary to support the 
stop. 
Although this Court has stated that "the subjective intent 
of the officer is irrelevant" in assessing whether a traffic stop is 
a pretext (Sierra. 754 P.2d at 977; see also Guzman. 864 F.2d at 
1515), it has repeatedly focused on the officer's state of mind in 
assessing whether a reasonable officer would have made the stop. 
See, e.g.. State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1990) 
("Furthermore, unlike the officer in Sierra. Trooper Avery was not 
suspicious of Mr. Marshall for other reasons before the stop, had 
not followed him in order to find some reason to pull him over, and 
before the alleged violation occurred, had not radioed for help 
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thereby indicating he intended to stop the vehicle.11); State v. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 979-980 (Utah App. 1988) ("Our conclusion that 
a reasonable officer would not have stopped Sierra for traveling in 
the left lane is buttressed by the events preceding Officer Smith's 
seizure of Sierra's automobile. As previously stated, Officer Smith 
was suspicious of Sierra before he observed Sierra commit any 
purported traffic violation. He had radioed for a computer check of 
the car's license plate but found it was not stolen. Nevertheless, 
he radioed for back-up assistance and exceeded the posted speed 
limit to catch Sierra."). But see State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 883 
(Utah App. 1989) (apparently disregarding the motivation of the 
officer). 
The tension created by this Court's assertion that 
subjective intent is irrelevant, yet its reliance on the officer's 
state of mind can perhaps be best resolved by including the 
officer's state of mind as one of the circumstances to be considered 
in assessing whether a reasonable officer would have made the stop. 
In determining whether a hypothetical reasonable officer 
would have stopped an individual for a traffic violation, this Court 
has also focused on whether the officer involved in the case or 
officers in general frequently issue citations for the alleged 
violation. See State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah App. 1989) 
(overruled on other grounds, State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 
1990). 
In the instant case, the State presented absolutely no 
evidence as to frequency with which officers stop vehicles solely 
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because they believe an individual does not have a license. Nor did 
the State establish the officers actually cited Defendant. In 
addition, because Enrique could well have been licensed in another 
state or country, the decision to stop him was not objectively 
reasonable. Finally, to the extent that the officer's state of mind 
is relevant, Det. McCarthy's only purpose in checking on whether 
Defendant had a license or stopping the vehicle was to search for 
drugs. But for that intent to search, a reasonable officer would 
not have stopped the vehicle. 
The officers' stop of the vehicle Enrique was driving was a 
pretext stop, in violation of the fourth amendment. 
C. THE SCOPE OF THE DETENTION EXCEEDED THE 
PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF A TRAFFIC VIOLATION STOP, IN 
VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
In State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989), the 
Utah Supreme Court articulated the parameters of a traffic stop: 
[W]hen an officer stops a vehicle for a traffic 
violation, he may briefly detain the vehicle and its 
occupants while he examines the vehicle registration 
and the driver's license. [citation omitted] 
The Schlosser court acknowledged that the United States Supreme 
Court has "held that even a small intrusion beyond the legitimate 
scope of an initially lawful search is unlawful under the Fourth 
Amendment." Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1135 citing Arizona v. Hicks, 
480 U.S. 321, 325, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 1153, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987). 
In State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990), 
this Court reiterated that: 
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fl[I]n determining whether the seizure and search 
were 'unreasonable' our inquiry is a dual 
one—whether the officer's action was justified at 
its inception, and whether it was reasonably related 
in scope to the circumstances which justified it in 
the first place." Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 
88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878-9, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 
Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435. 
This Court articulated the parameters for a traffic stop in 
a slightly different manner than did the Supreme Court in Schlosser: 
An officer conducting a routine traffic stop may 
request a driver's license and vehicle registration, 
conduct a computer check, and issue a citation. 
United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th 
Cir. 1988). 
This Court made it clear, however, that once the purpose for the 
stop has been fulfilled, any further investigative detention must be 
justified by a reasonable articulable suspicion of serious criminal 
activity. 
[0]nce the driver has produced a valid license and 
evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, "he must 
be allowed to proceed on his way, without being 
subject to further delay by police for additional 
questioning." [citation omitted]. Any further 
temporary detention for investigative questioning 
after fulfillment of the purpose for the initial 
traffic stop is justified under the fourth amendment 
only if the detaining officer has a reasonable 
suspicion of serious criminal activity. [United 
States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1519;] United 
States v. Walker, No. 90-CR-13, slip op. at 5 
(D. Utah, March 27, 1990). 
See also Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1519 (when driver produces valid 
license and proof that entitled to use car, he must be allowed to 
proceed; "[i]n order to justify #a temporary detention for 
questioning,7 the officer must also have reasonable suspicion 'of 
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illegal transactions in drugs or of any other serious crime."1 
[citation omitted]. 
In State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880 (Utah 1990), this Court 
held that the continued detention of the defendant was proper 
because information obtained by the officers during the course of 
the stop created a reasonable articulable suspicion. 
By contrast, in the present case, the officers launched 
into the narcotics investigation and request for consent to search 
almost immediately after the stop. Tl:7-8. McCarthy stated: 
I told him the reason for the stop, No. 1, he was 
driving without a license; had information he 
would be driving the car at this time and 
possible be in possession of some cocaine. I 
then asked him if I could have the consent to 
search himself as well as the vehicle. 
Tl:8. Apparently, Det. McCarthy informed Enrique immediately after 
stopping the vehicle that he thought drugs might be in the car, and 
that he wanted to search it. The officers did not learn anything 
during the questioning regarding the traffic violation which led to 
the search. Although the officers claimed that the entire stop, 
search and questioning of all three occupants took less than ten 
minutes, time is not the only relevant consideration. In this case, 
where the officers questioned the occupants about drugs and made it 
clear that they wanted to search the vehicle, the scope of the 
detention was exceeded, in violation of the fourth amendment. 
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POINT II. CONSENT DID NOT VITIATE THE INITIAL 
ILLEGAL DETENTION. 
In State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990), the Utah 
Supreme Court articulated the parameters of consent searches.6 The 
Arroyo court reemphasized that warrantless searches are per se 
unreasonable under the fourth amendment unless they fit within a few 
"specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Arroyo, 
796 P.2d at 687 quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 
S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); State v. Harris. 671 P.2d 175 
(Utah 1983). The Court also reiterated that the State has the 
burden of establishing that the search fits within one of the 
established exceptions. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687. 
Where illegal police conduct occurs as part of the initial 
detention, the State must establish two things in order to establish 
that a valid consent search occurred and that the evidence seized is 
admissible. First, the consent must be voluntarily given. Arroyo, 
796 P.2d at 688. Second, the State must establish that the consent 
was not obtained through "police exploitation of the primary or 
antecedent police illegality." Id. at 689.7 See also Robinson, 797 
P.2d at 437. 
6
 Arroyo overruled this Court's decision in the same case, 
which can be found at State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah App. 1989). 
7
 Arroyo also overruled a portion of this Court's decision 
in State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988). In Sierra, this 
Court adopted the view of the court in United States v. Carson, 793 
F.2d 1141 (10th Cir.), cert, denied 479 U.S. 914, 107 S.Ct. 315, 93 
L.Ed.2d 289 (1986), which rejected the requirement that the State 
establish that the consent was not obtained through police 
exploitation. 
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When the State "attempts to prove voluntary consent after 
an illegal police action/' it "'has a much heavier burden to satisfy 
than when proving consent to search' which does not follow police 
misconduct." Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688, quoting United States v. 
Melendez-Gonzalez. 727 F.2d 407, 414 (5th Cir. 1984). This heavier 
burden apparently applies to both the voluntary nature of the 
consent and the lack of exploitation. Id. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH. 
Whether consent is voluntarily given depends on "'the 
totality of the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics 
of the accused and the details of police conduct. [citations 
omitted]." Id. at 689; State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d at 437. 
Knowledge of the right to refuse is one factor to be considered, but 
the State is not required to establish such knowledge in order to 
establish voluntariness. Other circumstances include "subtly 
coercive police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable 
subjective state of the person who consents." Robinson, 797 P.2d at 
437, quoting Schneckleroth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 
S.Ct. 2041, 2048, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). 
Although the trial judge in Robinson "did not expressly 
resolve the voluntariness question," this Court did not remand the 
case for findings, determining instead that the undisputed facts 
failed to show that the State bore its burden of establishing the 
voluntariness of the search. In reaching its conclusion that the 
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totality of the circumstances failed to establish the voluntariness 
of the consent, this Court took the following into account: 
1. The defendants were not free to leave after the 
legal basis for the stop had terminated; 
2. "They were detained and questioned about 
matters other than the traffic violation on the 
side of the interstate by two armed 
officers . . . ," then ordered by one trooper 
to remain at the van . . . . 
3. "Next they were questioned about whether they 
were carrying any contraband and asked to 
consent to a search of the vehicle." 
4. "There is no evidence that Robinson was aware 
or was informed that he did not have to accede 
to the trooper's request." 
Robinson. 797 P.2d at 437-8. This Court pointed out that: 
it was apparent that the defendants would be kept in 
that custodial environment until the troopers 
satisfied their curiosity about the contents of the 
van . . . . 
Id. at 438. 
This Court then held that the facts failed to establish 
that the defendant had voluntarily consented to the search. 
In light of the troopers7 questioning and conduct, 
the coercive atmosphere at the time, and the other 
surrounding circumstances, we conclude that the 
State has not borne its burden of proving that 
Robinson's consent to search the van was voluntary. 
Id. 
Many of the circumstances in the present case are 
substantially similar to those in Robinson. As set forth in 
Point IC supra at 20, Enrique was not free to leave after the 
purpose of the traffic stop was concluded. Although at least four 
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officers were present, none issued a citation and a uniformed 
officer did not arrive until after the search had begun. 
The defendants were detained and questioned about possible 
narcotics possession (and immigration status) by several officers at 
the side of the road. Tl:36. One passenger was arrested. They 
were also questioned about contraband and the driver was asked to 
consent to a search. 
Although Agent Englin testified that he told Enrique that 
he was not required to give consent (Tl:30-31,, 36) , Det. McCarthy 
testified that he told Enrique he could refuse consent, but that he 
then could "go and get me a warrant."8 Tl::24„ In this case, the 
trial judge explicitly concluded that the officers did not have 
probable cause to search and would not have been able to obtain a 
warrant. R100. Therefore, this case is distinguishable from 
State v. Bobo, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 67 (Utah App. 1990), since the 
officers in that case merely stated the truth—that they were trying 
to get a warrant. In the present case, the officer apparently 
stated a falsehood—that he would get a warrant. 
Additional circumstances not present in Robinson added to 
the coercive atmosphere in this case. Det. McCarthy testified that 
his ultimate goal in stopping the vehicle was to gain consent to 
search the vehicle. Tl:13. The actions of the officer made it 
clear to the occupants that he intended to search the vehicle and 
that the detention was not only for a traffic violation. 
8
 At trial, Det. McCarthy claimed that he did not tell 
Enrique that he could get a warrant. T2:25. 
- 26 -
Immediately after asking for consent, Agent Englin asked 
again whether anything was in the vehicle. Several officers, far 
more than necessary for a traffic stop, were present in plain 
clothes. They were identified as narcotics or immigrations officers. 
The passengers were frisked, questioned about their 
immigration status, and checked for warrants. Officers arrested one 
of them. The number of officers, the nature of the detention, and 
the repeated questioning about drugs and immigration status created 
a coercive atmosphere in this case on par or greater to that in 
Robinson. 
Furthermore, the characteristics of the defendant 
demonstrate that any consent was not voluntary. He is an immigrant 
with temporary legal status in this country. Tl:30. His 
understanding of the legality of police conduct would in all 
probability be different from that of the average citizen. He 
speaks Spanish and needs an interpreter, not only in the courtroom 
but also at the side of the road. 
The totality of circumstances demonstrates consent was not 
voluntary. 
B. THE STATE DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT THE OFFICERS 
DID NOT EXPLOIT THE PRIMARY ILLEGALITY. 
In Guzman. 864 F.2d at 1521, the court outlined "the 
temporal proximity of the illegal stop and the consent, any 
intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy" of the 
officer's misconduct in assessing whether the State sustained its 
- 27 -
"heavier" burden of establishing that the police did not exploit the 
primary legality. See also United States v. Thompson, 712 F.2d 
1356, 1361 (11th Cir. 1983) ("The Supreme Court has identified three 
factors useful in determining whether a defendant's consent was 
tainted by the illegal detention: (1) the temporal proximity of the 
illegal detention and the consent; (2) the presence of intervening 
circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official 
misconduct. [citation omitted]." State v. McKenzie, 440 A.2d 1072 
(Me. 1983) (connection between illegal stop and seizure not vitiated 
by consent); United States v. Melendez-Gonzalez, 724 F.2d 407 (5th 
Cir. 1984) . 
In the present case, the temporal proximity of any consent 
to the illegal stop demonstrates that the primary illegality was 
exploited. The officers asked Enrique for consent shortly after 
pulling the vehicle over. Tl:8. The traffic citation had not yet 
been issued and the request for consent was mixed in with the 
assessment of whether Enrique was licensed. Tl:8, 17; T2:21. The 
officers testified that the entire procedure, including the search, 
took less than ten minutes. Tl:26. 
The lack of intervening circumstances also demonstrates 
that the primary illegality was exploited. Nothing in the record 
suggests that any intervening circumstances occurred in this case. 
Finally, the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct 
demonstrate that the primary illegality was exploited. 
Det. McCarthy testified that his purpose in stopping Enrique for a 
traffic violation was to ultimately search the car. As set forth in 
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Point IB, the detective used the minor traffic violation as a 
springboard to make contact with the defendant and search the car. 
The State failed to establish that the officers did not 
exploit the primary illegality in this case. The evidence seized 
must be suppressed. 
POINT III. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
CONVICT DEFENDANT OF UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
Once the cocaine was admitted into evidence, the issue 
presented to the jury was whether Enrique "possessed" that cocaine 
so as to be guilty of the crime charged. 
It is well established that "[a]ctual physical possession 
is not a required element of the crime of possession of a controlled 
substance." State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1987); 
State v. Fox. 709 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1985). "A conviction may also 
be based on constructive possession." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. 
In order to establish constructive possession, the State 
must prove "that there was a sufficient nexus between the accused 
and the drug to permit an inference that the accused had both the 
power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the 
drug. (citations omitted)" Id. "Whether a sufficient nexus 
between the accused and the drug exists depends upon the facts and 
circumstances of each case. (citation omitted)" Id. 
While ownership of the premises is one fact to consider, 
ownership alone is not "sufficient to establish constructive 
possession, especially when occupancy is not exclusive." Id. The 
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Fox court listed "other factors which might combine to show a 
sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug . . . ." Id. 
Those factors include incriminating statements or actions by the 
defendant, drugs found in a specific area controlled by the 
defendant, and the presence of drug parapherncilia in defendant's 
personal belongings. 
In Fox, the Supreme Court held that there was insufficient 
evidence to establish constructive possession by Clive Fox, one of 
the defendants, of marijuana plants found in the kitchen and 
greenhouse of a house. The * none bill for the house was in Clive7s 
name, but it had been that way for several yecirs. Clive had been 
seen at the house doing yard work, mail addressed to him was found 
in the house, and an expired identification Ccird was found in the 
room which was apparently the sleeping quarters of Clive. No 
paraphernalia or anything else in the room linked Clive to the 
marijuana plants. 
On the other hand, the Court held thcit there was sufficient 
evidence to find beyond a reasonable doubt thcit Gary Fox was in 
constructive possession of the plants. The* house was owned by Gary 
Fox and it was evident that he occupied th€> premises. His personal 
effects were found among the plants, and a marijuana growing guide 
was found in his bedroom. The greenhouses were constructed in 
proximity to the kitchen and the rest of the house, and marijuana 
plants were found in the kitchen. 
In State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1986), the 
Court held that there was insufficient evidence to convict the 
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defendant of the crime of possession of a weapon by a restricted 
person. In Banks. officers found a gun under a pillow in a bedroom 
of an apartment occupied by the defendant, his wife and a third 
person. The Court refused to hold that the presence of the weapon 
in the house was sufficient to impute possession and pointed out 
that: 
there is absolutely no evidence that Banks knew the 
weapon was in the apartment or that he exercised 
control over it. There is no logic in the State's 
suggestion that the mere presence of a gun in Banks7 
house supports an inference that Banks knew the gun 
was present or that he had some control over it. 
Id. at 1385. 
In the present case, the evidence established that the 
vehicle was registered to Enrique and his wife. Till?, 47-8. 
Enrique was driving the vehicle when it was stopped. Tl:6-7. 
Two other persons were in the car when the officers stopped 
it. Tl:9. Agent Englin testified at trial that one of the men (the 
man who was ultimately arrested on a warrant) was seated directly 
behind the driver and may have moved around during the course of the 
stop. 12:38, 40. Det. McCarthy testified that the back seat 
passenger was seated on the other side of the car, directly behind 
the passenger. Tl:9. Regardless of where the back seat passenger 
was seated, there was an individual in the back seat who could have 
secreted the small packet of drugs under the seat. 
The officers had to unbolt and remove the seat in order to 
locate the packet of cocaine. T2:49. If the defendant were 
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delivering cocaine during his lunch hour, it is unlikely that he 
would keep it in such an inaccessible place. 
In an effort to "marshall the evidence," Appellant brings 
to this Court7s attention the only evidence other than Appellant's 
ownership of and presence in the vehicle which might arguably 
support the conviction. In closing, the prosecutor argued two 
things: (1) that Defendant had physical control over his vehicle 
and access to all of its parts and (2) that the confidential 
informant had told the officers that Defendant would be transporting 
drugs, and all of the informant's information had proved true. The 
prosecutor included among the informant's statements information 
that the cocaine "would be found in a particular hiding place." 
T2:82. 
The use of the statements of the confidential informant for 
substantive purposes to link Enrique to the cocaine is problematic 
for several reasons. First, the officer's testimony is vague as to 
what information was actually conveyed by the confidential informant. 
Det. McCarthy did not clearly state at trial what 
information came from a confidential informant or that an informant 
told him that Enrique would possess cocaine. He stated: 
I received information during the lunch hour a 
certain individual would be occupying a certain 
vehicle and would be delivering . . . cocaine. 
Didn't know the amount." 
T2:ll. The following exchange occurred shortly thereafter: 
Prosecutor: What person were you there to observe? 
Det. McCarthy: Miguel Enrique Salas. 
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T2:12. In addition, on redirect examination of Agent Englin at 
trial, the following testimony occurred: 
Prosecutor: Was there anything in this particular 
search that was extraordinarily lengthy or 
extraordinarily short? 
Agent Englin: Yes. There is something that would 
certainly shorten a great deal in that we had 
information as to where we would likely find the 
substance. 
Q: Before you ever stopped him? 
A: That is correct. Yes, sir. 
Q: And did that prove true? 
A: Yes. 
T2:52. 
This exchange is ambiguous as to whether the agent was 
testifying that the officers were certain that there was cocaine 
somewhere in the car, and therefore searched it quickly and 
efficiently in places where cocaine is usually stashed, or had 
specific information that the cocaine would be found under the back 
seat. 
Although the prosecutor selected the latter interpretation, 
all other evidence at both the Motion to Suppress hearing and trial 
points to the former interpretation. The officers searched the 
entire car, including the trunk, before removing the back seat. 
Tl:21-2. Det. McCarthy testified at trial: 
We had, meaning Craig and I, Mr. Englin, he was 
searching the driver's side and I was searching the 
passenger's side front of the vehicle. We completed 
that. Underneath the seat, dashboard, under the 
mats, what-have-you. We continued to the back 
seats, checking doors, stuff like that. 
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T2:29. Had the officers known the drugs were under the back seat, 
they would have initially looked there rather than spending time 
searching the entire car. 
In addition, Det. McCarthy was in contact with the 
confidential informant (Tl:10-11) and never brought up this 
information; nor did he look under the back s€*at first or ultimately 
find the cocaine. 
Finally, the use of the informant's hearsay statements for 
substantive purposes is improper. See Rule 801(c), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1983). Defense counsel objected to the statements on 
hearsay grounds; the trial judge overruled the objection. T2:ll. 
Nevertheless, the statements were admissible only to explain why the 
officers acted as they did. See State v. Collier, 736 P.2d 231, 234 
(Utah 1987); Layton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Utah 1987). 
Hence, the statements of the confidential informant have 
little, if any, probative value. 
Ownership of and presence in a vehicle in which cocaine is 
found does not establish the required nexus, especially where others 
are present. The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Appellant possessed the cocaine in this case. 
POINT IV. THE REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION FAILED 
TO ADEQUATELY DEFINE THE CONCEPT FOR THE JURY. 
Prior to the trial in the present case, the Utah Supreme 
Court issued its opinion in State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147-49 
(Utah 1989), in which a majority of the Court adopted the analysis 
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set forth by Justice Stewart in his dissent in State v. Ireland, 773 
P.2d 1375, 1380-2 (Utah 1989). Relying on Johnson and Ireland, 
Defendant objected to Instruction No. 7, the reasonable doubt 
instruction given by the court. T2:77-9; R.74. (See Addendum C for 
a copy of Instruction No. 7.) Defendant also requested that his 
proposed reasonable doubt instruction be given. T2:77-9; R.58. 
(See Addendum D for a copy of Defendant's proposed instruction.) 
The trial court refused to give Defendant's proposed 
instruction, instead instructing the jury as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
All presumptions of law, independent of 
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a defendant 
is presumed innocent until he is proved guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. And in case of a 
reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is 
satisfactorily shown he is entitled to an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is 
upon the State to prove the defendant guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
does not require proof to an absolute certainty. 
Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is 
based on reason and one which is reasonable in view 
of all the evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt 
and not a doubt which is merely fanciful or 
imaginary or based on a wholly speculative 
possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
that degree of proof which satisfies the mind, 
convinces the understanding of those who are bound 
to act conscientiously upon it and obviates all 
reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt 
which reasonable men and women would entertain, and 
it must arise from the evidence or lack of evidence 
in this case. 
Although an identical instruction was recently approved by 
this Court in State v. Pedersen. 150 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Utah App. 
1990), Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reconsider 
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that approval in light of the failure of the instruction to 
adequately define reasonable doubt. 
In Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. , 11 S.Ct. , 112 
L.Ed,2d 339 (1990) (per curiam), the United States Supreme Court 
reversed a capital homicide conviction where the reasonable doubt 
instruction was constitutionally defective. The Cage court 
reaffirmed that due process as guaranteed by the fourteenth 
amendment requires "proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime." Cage at 1, citing In re 
Winship. 397 U.S. 358/ 364 (1970). 
Cage implicitly supports the argument that "reasonable 
doubt" is not self-defining since the Court rejected the Cage 
instruction despite repeated usage of the term "reasonable doubt." 
Moreover, the Court determined that due process requires 
greater protection than simply equating the doubt with a "grave 
uncertainty," an "actual substantial doubt" or a "moral certainty." 
Furthermore, the Cage court did not perform a "harmless error" 
analysis and refused to place itself in the role of factfinder for 
each and every criminal appeal. The Court noted that the reasonable 
doubt instruction "is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of 
convictions resting on factual error[,]" and apparently left that 
task to the jury. Considering the charge as a whole, the Cage 
opinion found that the reasonable doubt instruction did not meet the 
appropriate criminal standard. 
The language of the Cage instruction is similar to the 
language in the reasonable doubt instruction given in the present 
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case.9 Compare State v. Cage. 554 So.2d 39, 41 (La. 1989), with 
Instruction No. 7 contained in Addendum C. 
The instruction given in the present case fails to give the 
jury guidance or a working definition of the term "beyond a 
reasonable doubt." The instruction could refer to a "clear and 
convincing" or "preponderance of the evidence" standard by inserting 
those words where "beyond a reasonable doubt" occurs in the 
instruction. The instruction fails to give the jury any guidance as 
to the meaning of the term, and is therefore defective. 
The minimal evidence regarding possession in this case 
emphasizes the importance of the reasonable doubt instruction. An 
adequately instructed jury that understood the concept may well have 
acquitted Appellant of the charge. 
9
 Both instructions have a presumption of innocence 
clause; both instructions mandate acquittal if the State fails to 
meet its burden of proof; both instructions do not require proof to 
an absolute certainty; both instructions require the doubt to be 
reasonable, or based on reason; Cage condemns doubts based on "mere 
caprice and conjecture"; the instruction in the instant case 
disallows doubts which are "merely fanciful or imaginary or based on 
a wholly speculative possibility"; and both instructions state that 
the doubt must be a doubt that a reasonable person could entertain. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial or dismissal. 
SUBMITTED this / day of February, 1991. 
CANDICE A. JOHNSON 
Attorney for (Derendant/Appellant 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that eight copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this day of February, 1991. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED by _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ^ ^ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
this day of February, 1991. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Third Juaic«cii DiSifict 
MAY 2 1 1930 
CANDICE A. JOHNSON, (#4745) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
MIGUEL SALAS, : Case No. 901900589FS 
: HONORABLE LEONARD H. RUSSON 
Defendant. : 
MOTION 
COMES NOW the defendant, MIGUEL SALAS, through counsel, 
CANDICE A. JOHNSON, and moves this Court to suppress the evidence 
seized in a search of the defendant's vehicle pursuant to the 
constitutional guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure as 
provided in Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution, 
and the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
Defendant asserts the following bases for the 
unconstitutional seizure of evidence: 
1. Officer McCarthy did not have knowledge of reasonable, 
articulable facts that would support a reasonable suspicion that the 
defendant, Miguel Salas, was engaged in criminal activity. 
2. The stop of Mr. Salas1 vehicle was a pretext to search 
S A L T U\KCL L W W K I i 
OGOOIS 
for evidence of another crime. State v. Arroyo; 770 P.2d 153 
(1989)/ State v. Marshall, 124 Utah Adv. Rep. 60 (1989); State v, 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Otah App. 1988). 
DATED this <£/ day of May, 1990. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
f^^'tf^t* 
CANDICE A. JOHNSON 
Attorney for(Defendant 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
You and each of you please take notice that the 
above-entitled matter will come on regularly for hearing 
on LCULJU> the ^U^Xday of May, 1990, at the hour 
of e^ .-gy? P. .n». before the Honorable LEONARD H. RUSSON. Please 
govern yourselves accordingly. 
DATED this c3/ day of May, 1990. 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the Salt 
Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
this Jl'/ day of May, 1990. 
OHOOIS 
ADDENDUM B 
TY.:<&y.;sj::_, v. O ^ f n c i 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
CHARLES D. BEHRENS, Bar No. 5176 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
JUN 1 1S30 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MIGUEL ENRIQUE SALAS, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 901900589 
Honorable Leonard H, 
Russon 
The above-captioned matter came on for Suppression 
Hearing on May 23, 1900. The defendant was represented by his 
attorney, Candice Johnson, and the State appeared through its 
attorney, Charles D. Behrens. The Court having considered the 
evidence and testimony, now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On March 2, 1990, Detective Bill McCarthy of Metro 
Narcotics received information from a confidential informant that 
the defendant would be transporting drugs for sale in his vehicle 
during his lunch break from work. 
2. Upon receipt of this information, Detective 
McCarthy used computer resources available to him to determine if 
the defendant had a valid driver's license. Detective McCarthy was 
v* \J \Jt v o O 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 891900589 
Page two 
unable to find a driver's license listing for the defendant. 
3. At approximately noon on March 2, 1990, Detective 
McCarthy and Immigration officer Craig Englin observed the 
defendant driving from his place of employment. Detective McCarthy 
affected a traffic stop believing that the defendant was driving 
without a driver's license. 
4. Upon being contacted by Detective McCarthy, the 
defendant indicated that he did not have his driver's license with 
him. Detective McCarthy asked the defendant if he could search his 
car for cocaine. Detective McCarthy indicated to the defendant 
that he did not have to give consent. The defendant consented to 
the search but Detective McCarthy felt that there may be a language 
barrier and requested that Officer Englin request consent from the 
defendant in Spanish. 
5. Officer Englin has extensive experience in using 
the Spanish language. Officer Englin indicated to the defendant, 
in Spanish, that the police wanted his consent to search his car 
and that he did not have to give it. The defendant consented to 
this request and gave consent for the search. Both McCarthy and 
Englin described the defendant's demeanor as cooperative and calm. 
6. Upon searching the vehicle, Officer Englin found a 
baggie containing a white powdery substance which Detective 
McCarthy field tested positive for cocaine. The defendant was 
00009! 
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arrested for Possession of a Controlled Substance and given a 
traffic citation. 
7. The defendant was detained for less than ten 
minutes from the time he was stopped until his arrest. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court finds that the traffic stop made by 
Detective McCarthy was legal and justified. An officer who 
observes a violation of the law has an obligation and a duty to 
investigate. The fact that Detective McCarthy's primary area of 
responsibility is in narcotics does not destroy the legality of the 
stop. 
2. The Court finds that the defendant gave a knowing 
and voluntary consent to search his vehicle. The defendant was 
advised in English and Spanish that the officers wanted his consent 
to search his vehicle. He was also advised in both languages that 
he need not give consent. The Court finds that the defendant did 
give his consent to search the vehicle. 
3. The Court finds that but for that consent there 
would not have been probable cause to search further. 
4. The Court finds that the extent of the search was 
reasonable and that the time period for which the defendant was 
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detained was also reasonable 
DATED this day of May, 1990. 
BY THE COURT 
O^RABLE LEONARD H. RUSSON 
TKird District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
CANDICE AV(^6HNSON 
CDB/sc/0151 
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ADDENDUM C 
INSTRUCTION N O . _ L _ 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in 
favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he 
is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And in case of a 
reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, 
he is entitled to an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the State 
to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute 
certainty. Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is 
based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of all the 
evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is 
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly speculative 
possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of 
proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of 
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it and obviates 
all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt which 
reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must arise from 
the evidence or the lack of the evidence in this case. 
OOGO 
ADDENDUM D 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A defendant is presumed innocent unless that defendant is 
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If you have a reasonable 
doubt, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal. The burden is 
upon the state to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The state's evidence must eliminate all reasonable doubt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, however, does not require proof to 
an absolute certainty. 
A reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and 
women would have, and it must arise from the evidence or the lack of 
evidence in this case. Depending upon the circumstances, 
possibilities may create a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, 
reasonable doubt cannot be a doubt that is merely fanciful or 
imaginary, or is based upon a wholly speculative possibility. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof 
which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of those who 
are bound to act conscientiously upon it, and eliminates all 
resonable doubt. A determination that a defendant has committed a 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt demands the application of reason, 
impartiality and common sense. You must have greater assurance of 
the correctness of such a decision than you would normally have in 
reaching the weighty decisions affecting your own life. The reason 
for this standard is that you cannot undo your verdict oncp you have 
announced it. , i ^ IP WQuM 
In your personal life, on the other hand, you may be able to undo or 
modify the consequences of decisions you make. 
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